No. 31

<Transcendental sense-investigation into the whole of human existence and its implied teleology. Development of autonomy as development of the rational idea of true humanity>[[1]](#footnote-0)

*<Content:> Teleology, instinct, absolute obligation, self-preservation, love, brotherly love, suicide.*

<§ 1. The providing life and the universal care for the whole life’s future. The two ideals of a satisfying whole life>

The static constitution of the world. – The analysis leads to experience as an original layer in all practice, but not <as> an independent layer, and towards a layer characterizing special practice. The practical existence of man among his co-humanity within his surrounding world. The pregiven world as the practical life-space of man, as open field of possible practice – human [practice]. Animal and man. Practice in the wider sense of the “I act” from an ability already formed in advance. Human practice of goods in the special sense, directed towards a respective good, towards a lasting object of use (practice of providing, of reshaping something already existing into the useful thing, of usefully connecting with other usefulnesses as a means for an object of purpose, which is to be attained primarily). Goods are usefulnesses, purposefulnesses; their being has an intentional relation to a possible and previewed way of “utilization”. The original utilization lies within the current joy; but every utilization is satisfaction, fulfillment of a practical intention, although not final satisfaction of the attainment; and the joy of attainment then still is not a joy of pleasure, in which the good shows itself in its being good. Goods of consumption, used up in the joy. Goods that may ever again be enjoyed – the mental goods. Take note: “hunger” and joy in the genesis [426] always precede the lasting good. But the apperception of the lasting good is always already and for everything guiding for man, that is, every joy is utilization.

The providing life, the existence in constant care for future, grows with the repeating experience of an <object> or similar objects, as satisfying practical needs, <as> appropriate in future return, as “<something> with the help of <which>”, until the apperception as a means (nutritional means, defensive means, means for pushing, etc.) and on <until> the constitution of a will determination: this object – or such an object – remaining as fit, as useful, as good, with a special intention or not, to remember, to have at hand, and to possess, in the “therefore”. Unity of a provision for future.[[2]](#footnote-1)

Creation of a life generally providing for future, a life, not only having an objective horizon of future, but providing in present for a future of life, which is as satisfying as possible. The Ego provides for that by always creating (and obtaining, or rather, striving for) goods for itself, which it may handle as its “acquisitions”, possessions, if the time comes, the moment of the needing-it-now, of the need, which “has to” be satisfied. Satisfaction is intentionality of the current “self-preservation”. Dissatisfaction is inhibition of self-preservation. The Ego as an Ego of “lasting” needs, its life style is that of need-intention towards need-fulfillment, and in such a way, that the same need-intentions ever again grow and push towards satisfaction, so that the style and the types of needs remain, coming from original needs and rising towards higher founded ones, which are then again lasting ones, grounding a lasting special style of needs.

The animal’s life as life within concrete present, with its small content of future. The human life as life into a wide future of life, as life within provision, becoming the universal care for the whole future of life. The whole life in its wholeness as a future possibility becomes thematic and thematic in the universal care, as its style of single cares and single satisfactions or disappointments [427] may be cared for in advance. This implies the first ideal of a satisfying whole life as of a satisfying one indeed, in which all eventualities are provided for in advance, and of a life, in which the goods are always created and kept in value in every present from care for present and action, simply providing for future, in one with that that the present at the same time satisfies the primary needs vivid within it and those, which have now awakened.[[3]](#footnote-2)

Thus as a second ideal a life of constant and (ideally) pure self-preservation, which has arrived at the self-confidence that self-preservation is provided for in future, or rather, will be provided for from proper and foreign and ever new work, the enabling of which now itself again becomes a matter of care, of the need, of the satisfaction on a higher step. Correlate of the caring man-Ego and his caring life. Appropriately created surrounding world, created into a world of goods.

Unpreventable inhibitions, interruptions, disappointments – included into the style of a satisfying human existence as a style of chaining satisfactions while eventually overcoming the inhibitions, a progress, not only being the result of satisfying the primal needs, but a rising and satisfying of higher, founded needs, a progress of life in the rise.

As a whole: Ideal of a whole life, having the unitary style of a life that is desirable, and in which the Ego lives within the habitual certainty of its secured “existence”, its mastering the life’s surrounding world, in the certainty to be able to create the surrounding world with its own force (and socially with the help of others) into a world of goods, or to be able to equip it with a world of goods, enabling a ”joyful” life in its availability. Correlate of a satisfying life in the designated style is within the feeling the unity of a mood of lasting satisfaction, belonging into every phase of this life as well (as long as it actually proceeds in this form, being accepted as that by the Ego itself), and, although a present moment of life, still having an intentionality of feeling of secure hope, [428] anticipating future. To be satisfied with my life, to now live in the form of life satisfaction, this implies more than acceptance in the moment, it implies intentionally and in an anticipated way: I will be able, this is what I may expect and hope, to feel satisfaction in every future moment of life. If I cannot, then I am not yet satisfied or only to a limited extent: if, etc.

<§ 2. The ideal of the single one’s “true” existence, and of a humanity. The problem of suicide>

All that now integrated into intersubjectivity and only thereby made concrete. Unity of the Ego as human Ego in a distinguished form: unity of a human existence in the will towards a life in provision for future and in the hope and purpose, to be always able to create life’s future happily, in the sense of a satisfying existence. In the connection of community: the possible special shape of the same, community of subjects willing it in such a way, being guided by such a life ideal, communalization of these single wills, respect for dispute of the single subjects therein, etc. agreement, equalization of the interests in self-preservation: idea of a univocal community preserving itself, in which every member comes off “as well as possible”. But can it come off “well”? There is no attention paid to lower and higher goods, to brotherly love, etc. We are still standing on Hobbe’s standpoint. Only when the other one’s self-preservation has been cognized as included within me, etc.

Highest ideal of a “true existence” of the single one and of a humanity in the form of a “true” existence of community. Anyway, the will belongs to it, stretches over the whole life, and community will for the community. But now the irrationalities and the evaluation of the goods in their “true values” come into view.[[4]](#footnote-3)

Here is a clear course! In any case the providing would have to be regarded first, the sense of a caring existence striving for satisfaction as being within a community of existence.

[429] The originally instinctive relatedness of every Ego to its “family” as an instinctive implication of the “wellbeing” of these other ones in mine. The other ones’ (relationship by marriage of the children “with” foreigners) “wellbeing” though instinctively again implies the wellbeing of its other ones, or rather of its “neighbors” in the instinctively original sense, who are not without further ado my neighbors as well. The first thus is the generative implication. It stretches over the present and over my stretch of life respectively, that is, beyond my death.

My life’s care encompasses my children, furthermore my actual or to be hoped for grandchildren. My existence in self-preservation (in complete form: my life’s satisfaction) encompasses, implies self-preservation, etc. of my family (in relationship by marriage), then brothers and sisters, etc. Not with the same steps, in degrees of this implication of care. Order of preference and putting last: first my own “generation”, then fellow brothers and theirs, etc.

Transcendence of the will to genuineness beyond death through constitution of a practical “beyond”: of a being practical world, as an “infinite” one transcending the finite existence. The existence depends on my, on our will. The existence in the passive drive and being driven progresses irrationally, progresses in blindness, progresses in luck and misfortune, progresses in a way that existence remains possible first in childish drivenness and then in compulsive grown up social morality and the pious constitution of the support by a religion, with the counter-image of the irrational finiteness, the perfect God, spreading his coat of endlessness as endless perfection over all finiteness, turns everything eventually into the good, guarantees immortality, and bliss of the pious one in eternal life. Man, now taking on the “irrational” life by “rationalizing” it in a religious way: God, who guarantees future bliss.[[5]](#footnote-4)

[430] Then the setting in of the new, autonomous *ratio* as thinking, judging, cognizing reason, and the self-responsibility being rational in a new sense; eventually theory growing from it, encompassing and trying to solve all problems of the world as special theoretical problems.

Breakdown of science through science itself in its methodizing as technization. Loss of the *ratio* through the ratio’s impact itself. Renewal of science as function of the “reasonable life”, of life in the theoretical will as function of the volitional existence. The autonomous human type, emerging from man within finiteness, the compulsive one, and then volitionally-rationally regulating himself in a limited way. The taking over of the complete infinities, the irrationalities of any kind, emerging from them, and from death as the secure limitation of life, that cannot overcome the infinities in this finiteness – in the passive form of a life in constant direction towards the best possible as the most valuable worldly thing (values in the proper sense or <values> of the first step). The final overcoming. “The struggle for existence”. The problem of suicide in the despair of “existence” – despite all reason and science. The world cannot be forced among my purposes of bliss. The suicide victim as a bankrupt. He is completely at a loss, does not see any possibility to overcome “fate”, he is absolutely tuned towards a goal of bliss within worldliness as a well-ordered world, which can be mastered in the infinity of life. The suicide victim also and ever again considers his situation, and he understands that there is no way out unless some coincidence, being infinitely improbable. This is the suicide victim from a lower step autonomy. Consequence of the disbelief in a “sense” of the world, in the “rational” sense of human existence in the world as an infinite one, and by way of the infinity within the “irrational”. In the autonomous-rational age is the existence’s tragic that this sense is not to be understood as rational – for the worldly man. What would the consequence of the universal worldliness and unintelligibility be for me?

Does not suicide imply a countersense? Is not every goal of striving fulfillment of a need, satisfaction, joy? And is not the universal goal of life, seen as a whole, necessarily [431] a satisfying life, which may and should be wished for? Can the wish to stop it, the wish for death, be taken into life?

Is there a “rightful”, rational wish for death, a wish, still so often being a fact of life? Such a wish does not mean the wish to take one’s life. We have something peculiar there. At first it seems to be an essential law: If I cognize that I can do something I wish for, then I “have to” wish for it. I may wish for someone else’s redemption through death (whom, for example, I see as someone hopelessly falling into decline), while I would vehemently reject taking his life, to do anything to make him die. Suicide – a doing, an acting, the completion of which is not a happy situation, not a joy, but the non-being. But what I am now striving for, and what is making me happy now as a suicide victim, if I take some poison, is, that I thereby gain the state of certainty to be redeemed from my hopeless life, from my unendurable suffer, etc. I am glad that there will be an end for me. And this is the joy I aimed at.[[6]](#footnote-5) Someone may simply have such a joy, if he has arrived at the conviction that his life in suffering illness, supposed to be incurable, now quickly comes to an end.

Has all difficulty been removed by that now? Can such wishes be justified, how can right and wrong be eventually clarified here?

If all were dead, how about the world then? The chain of generations would have an end. The world of present, would it not have an end, and thereby world as such? I am apodictic as I, the living one. And as long as I live, the world is verified by the *alteri* necessarily to be assumed from me. And therefore I have life after my death and my death itself as a worldly occasion. [432] But if all men died now, I would still see that the transcend[ent]al subjectivity would be eradicated then, which causes a future world to be. The future being is open. Certainly, but only if men are living and do not all choose death. But is a man’s death the death of his transcendental monad? What might actually be derived from constitutive phenomenology?

<§ 3. Steps of self-constitution of a rational humanity in the light of transcendental phenomenology. Genuine brotherly love and true self-love>

Lowest step: Drive of self-preservation, drive towards other ones, towards communalization. Love drive, enlargement of the love for others towards general brotherly love, drive towards the founding of love communities – also of egotistic communities for self-preservation.

Higher step: Reason, *ratio* and rational life, rationalization of the world through science, and science as a function of the rational command over the world by man, over the other ones, over himself.

Highest step of rationalization, highest step of the autonomous man as a rational man. Highest step of human theoretical autonomy: the transcendental phenomenology and phenomenological science. Highest step of human practical autonomy: the step of the absolute reason or of life under the idea of absolute reason, the phenomenologically grounded life. Idea of a universal life of reason. Idea of my life and of the life of those living as well under the idea that it was that way from my self-volition and all self-volition and communalized volition, that is, to volitionally create as well by me, and commonly and always created by us – I repeat, that it is that way, that I can absolutely wish, have to choose and wish from “absolute” reason. But what does this mean? What kind of absoluteness is that?

The phenomenology has uncovered the steps of self-constitution of intersubjectivity vividly reproducing itself, and of the world [433] constituting itself within it, it has uncovered the historicity of the transcendental subjectivity and of the world being for it, it has uncovered the motivation, in which human life in its worldly practice becomes one full of suffer, not only through single sufferings, but through contradiction between its universal human aimings and the irrational abnormalities of the world, with its contingencies, with its fates from nature and in the life of community, and the “contingently” happening death. It has brought light to the developments of motivation leading to man’s autonomy through reason and science, and to this autonomy’s break, since this is the first autonomous reason in the struggle with the world’s structure of fate and death. But it also points to the modification, into which the philosophically scientific striving for autonomy falls in the methodical-technical operation, how it sinks into secondary blind drivenness and lostness to the world (which is rather self-lostness and the other ones’ self-lostness). It shows how in genuine brotherly love not the other one is thematic as a world object, as something real, but the other one as a counter-Ego (companion), and how in love a transcendental personal, i.e. lasting unification takes place, how much it seems made worldly at the same time; whereas worldly activities make themselves at home in operating brotherly love, in operating welfare, with the original goal indeed to the other one a favor, but how this has become an empty symbol, a conventionalized goal, not containing and creating anything of vivid love any more, vivid touch and unification with the other one, and thus neither actual counter love.[[7]](#footnote-6) It shows how brotherly love as original genuine love-unification also has a counter part in true self-love, the loving relatedness towards oneself and the shape of proper life as [a shape] to be loved. (To live in “unity” with myself!) It shows how one is combined with the other, and how genuine and lower love differ. True self-love. – When can I love myself, when <can> I live in a way and live from habitual abilities [434] that I can love my life and [my] being within life? Love cannot be commanded. When is my life of such a kind that I, living it, have to love it? If I have to love it, then I want it necessarily. – Or could I wish to prefer something else, for example the life of others? But how could I wish for that, without wanting my life? And is not the other ones’ loving itself my own loving, which necessarily has to be loved in one?

<§ 4. The goal of genuine existence and the decisions for absolute goals. Absolute art of life>

When do I have to love my life? When I do not only live as such, but live in constant unity with me, in continued “self-preservation”, live in a life continuously “satisfying” me. Does this mean <that I> live in the unity (totality) of an always “succeeding” practice? But what would then belong to this unity? Luck in the common sense? But fate and death! Shall I, in order to first abstract from death, make an account of luck? Even if I did not have much “misfortune” in detail, would a lucky life in the eudaimonistic sense be one that needs to be loved? And I myself to be loved as striving for it and attaining it? I need to only consider goals with the title “luck” as absolute final goals with a view to fate and death, and they fall prey to worthlessness, while they regain a relative right, but with a changed sense in subordination to the goal of genuine life and genuine existence. How does this overcome death and fate? What is its “genuineness” constituted of? A life in the absolute obligation, which is indeed ordered by absolute oughtnesses (objects of the Ego’s absolute decisions), for which I absolutely decide myself, in such a way that each and every one of my decisions receives a practical sense from them, value and practical possibility for me as an absolute practical Ego.

But there are multiple questions here. First: What are these: Decisions of the absolute obligation? Free decisions of my Ego, that is, not merely instinctive ones I follow in a driven way, but simply as being free, which are accepted by me once and for all, because I [435] have once and for all decided myself for them. But “to absolutely decide oneself” has a different sense. Also a decision in the form “once and for all” can be as my decision for wealth, power, etc., accepted by in my whole life. And still it may happen that they need to be given up by me in a way that I cannot love myself, but downright need to hate, disdain [myself], because I had [made] them as pure and simple, determining my life.

Simply this is shown in the concurrency with fate and death. Absolute goals, those for which I decide as “absolute obliging ones”, are of such a kind that I can only love myself, if I follow them, that I again have to hate myself, if I let them, their acceptance by me, drop; <they are of such a kind> that I have to follow them practically in life, if I shall remain in pure love for me, the absolutely unchangeable one, and that I only then do possibly not realize their goals, and may <not> realize, if another absolute obligation is struggling with them and a synthetic higher absolute obligation demands to put them last. But simply with regard to such possibilities do I need to universally have in view my life and my life’s possibilities beyond the moment, in order to not miss a higher obligation, which might come into question for me. What has been put last though, anyway remains lastingly what it is; Relativity does not deprive it of its character of absolute<ness>. The absolute synthesis only decides unambiguously, if it has grown to absolute certainty of obligation, how I need to absolutely decide myself in the struggle of absolutenesses. The practical decision is absorbed, but not the absolute value itself. It is sacrificed – in the tragedy of the sacrifice -, but in such a way that I still can and have to love myself for the tragedy’s sake, in the absolute love, the correlate of which is my absolute value, if I simply am and remain according to the norms.

From here formal ontology of the absolute values and of life towards them (formal absolute axiology and practice)[[8]](#footnote-7) Absolute art of life – formal artistic doctrine of the right individual life, that is, in a certain way a “technology”. But can such a [436] life actually run in a “technicized” way? Is this a first formal and then material system of rules I have to apply “mechanically”? Can “ethical” life become a life within an ethical operation? There is some danger indeed. Because it is only something absolutely obliging, an absolute value within the absolute position taking, as an absolute love; and if a love were mechanized, it would be no love. Although love becomes habitual it is still genuine and actual only in active doing. The habitually firm directedness has to become current in the acting in current loving evaluation.[[9]](#footnote-8)

But we need to say here: A declining technique is an ordered doing in the direction of goals, but eventually the reasons, that which gives rational sense, have not been awakened, they are “forgotten”; they are not only not actually reproduced, they are not awakened either and in the background – like for example cognitions I actually have in my command as mine, ready to be reactivated in a “secondary evidence”. Only if I follow them I am a rational one and rational in autonomous self-responsibility.

We simply have such a reduction to a technique in the ethical [realm]. I can absolutely decide myself through apperception and its proper evidence of transference in the momentary situation. I can also [do this] through and at the same time through the appellation at an essential principle coming into question here, whereby I possible do not have the opportunity to completely reactivate it as a principle. But if it has merely become formal where I have no command at all times over the cognitional sense, then my acting is worthless afterwards.

<§ 5. The idea of genuineness and the ideal of a genuine humanity>

But now something else is no less important. The empty talking of the absolute obligation, etc. is the form for types of decisions and actions actually emerging in life. But where are the examples? Mother’s love, and motherly decisiveness in the [437] care, or father’s love, general brotherly love, love for the art, science, for culture, etc.?

But here phenomenology first needs to perform the necessary constitutive investigations. Instinctive drives precede, a life of instincts having a certain absoluteness in passivity. How is the absolute life of reason motivated as absolute autonomy? And how is this life linked in an absolute rational life of intersubjectivity as an idea, as ideal possibility of a certain community life? How is the being of true men of a true humanity constituted, the being of the same in a true life, etc.? The experience of true decisions, of true men is there; But the experience needs to be uncovered, and its proof lies within the uncovering. There are also onesidednesses, mediacies, fallacies. Is science an absolute value in itself, art again an absolute [value] in itself, civilization eventually as well, etc.? Are not all true absolutenesses bound in a synthetic unity? Is not a science only an absolute value with the help of its horizon, since it is a member of the one universal philosophy, and then the phenomenological [philosophy]? And is it only a value and an absolute value since it is or when it is a formation of an absolute philosophical life, one loving in pure love? And is this life again only a value, an absolute value, since it stands there in the service as such of the absolute all-life itself, which, with the help of its form, needs to be loved absolutely and to be wished for absolutely by transcendental subjectivity? And is not the art an absolute value only in the same sense as a function? And does not this function determine the limits of the genuineness for this and all culture, that is, what makes it a true culture?

But here we see the huge entanglements and the series of steps of the intentions towards genuineness. Science and art are intersubjective formations as actions of love, intersubjective actions with a horizon of infinity.

The idealism of culture needs to be clarified by phenomenology, and constitutively be lead towards genuine original sense-bestowing, and then be followed in this infinity and on the steps of its actualization in historical development. Then the result is relativity of the genuinenesses, which in their historical [438] situation are absolutenesses. All that exists is enroute, is in constitutive development in an endless constitutive connection; and this also relates to the being of the absolute values, the being of ideas of absoluteness (ideas of genuine humanity) as ideas for their historical time.

The absolute, the ethically-normative good is not bound to science, to phenomenology; it first grows in a concrete way, it is then there as something absolute with unclarified horizons and yet horizons, in which the telos is already pregiven, preconstituted. But these absolutenesses in their historical relativity – unclarified on top of that, particularly according to their traditional origins or their absolute universal functions – cannot be the end. A necessary historical development leads beyond them – simply through the breakdowns, through the growing up of that autonomy, which has the higher absoluteness of universality. Every ethical life is absolute in its limits, it may be afflicted with superstitions, with traditionalisms. The growing up of philosophy means growing up of an absolute, that is, an absolute universal autonomy, as a being and life, which can absolutely explain itself in every regard, which simply wants to be unity of an absolute life through and through, in which the unity of the absolute personality can be constituted in the absolute community, absolute in its relativity. And this universality also means that one encompassing all co-subjects. These are, when I have become an absolute ethical subject, only thought for me myself, *sub specie* of the genuineness, as subjects of true self-preservation, under the demand of this same autonomy. But they are also co-subjects for me as subjects in my ethical field of care; their true weal and woe concerns me myself; and mine vice versa concerns them, insofar as they have grasped the sense of their norm. The idea of an intersubjective personal practice of community grows up from there, not directed to the world, in order to “reign” it, to use it, but towards humanity, in order to educate it – that is, us all in community – towards an absolute humanity (or rather, transcendentally towards absolute transcendental subjectivity). All other values then are implied in that, the “positivity” of which now takes on absolute significance as serving means for the primary absolute.

[439] I have to love this universal humanity, as developing under the idea of the good, but from human free will, and directed towards it in constant consciousness, although the absolutely fulfilled love might only be directed at the actualization of the ideal. But as I love the single man, “who endeavors in a striving way”, and [as I], by loving him, love the idea of the morally good in him, of his good, thus for humanity. And correlatively this holds true for the world as one shaping itself in the life of genuine community towards a beautiful and good one, and shaping itself ever more purely. (Its values of luck have not been lost.) This love is endless, is absolute and universal, it is of a kind that I cannot think of anything, which I might love more, namely in a sense that I could abandon the loved for its sake. If I live in this volitional bent, then I live for me in the will towards my genuine life and as a member of humanity in the will towards a becoming genuine humanity, then this will is absolutely motivated. Or if I view the possibility of such a life as such a one, which I would absolutely love, and unsurmountably, then I cannot do otherwise than to decide myself for it in a willing way – although it may happen that I become weak, in viewing, loving, willing.

If the problem of death now does not solve itself, how the problem of fate, of misfortune of any kind, of ageing, of the paralyzing illness, of all irrationalities? To choose the absolute morally good, that is: to overcome death and devil. He who comes off the morally good, is almost addicted to death, because he lives a life he cannot love, which he rather and absolutely has to hate. He almost performs suicide – he lives in such a way as if he justified suicide and then performed it consequently. When he sacrifices his life for community or from genuine brotherly love, then he loses his earthly life, but he gains his true life, since a life act is performed in the decision for the sacrifice, which he has to absolutely love and want. And in one he verifies the life of humanity as an absolutely demanded one, nice and good in infinity, as on the other side humanity itself, having become aware of its true humanlike sense and life sense, needs to volitionally sustain itself in life in infinity, because this life is one to be wished for absolutely. And thereby is the infinity of the world ideally justified from this will, demanded and in infinity constituting itself in the actuality of the [440] wished for intersubjectivity necessarily wanting itself.

Phenomenology now needs to show by constitutively uncovering all that, how transcendental intersubjectivity can only be: at first a world in passive constitution constituting from instincts, on a preliminary step and with an open horizon, how it then needs to “grow up” from inner motivation, from original aptitudes for reason on a lower step, how it has to rise in the breakdown of the lower reason. Namely, concrete reason and an absolutely directed one itself is there already prior to science as the turning of original instincts. But science grows from there within culture – eventually phenomenology, clarifying, grounding, absolutely firming up absolute autonomy. This [phenomenology] then reenables a regeneration of life in absolute genuineness and originality, but on a higher step, in a radicalness of the awareness of the ideal final sense and the progress towards it, which enables an ultimately valid progress for the whole humanity in its unity. This at the same time is the highest and final step of the world’s constitution and of the constitution of the transcendental subjectivity in universal absolute unification for itself and from itself. From itself through a universal will from universal phenomenological reason. But essentially no static actualization is possible here. The being in the absolute sense (absolutely being only in its universality) thus is only in a dynamic process of development. Development on all steps is the process of intentional actualization. It is performed in every transcendental single-I for it as its intentional development from a primal aptitude in instinctive, “unconscious” drives and, guided by them on the lowest level, on a higher step from an awakened νοῦς θεωρητικός and as practical reason. But the development of every single Ego is intentionally intertwined with that of the others immediately and mediately. The generative connection of the single Egos constituting an intersubjective sequence, and the whole connection of communalization in every objective present is a connection of intersubjective intentionality, which, although taking place in special lines within the single subjects, is still at the same time a unitary intentionality, as the subject of which the universal transcendental [441] subjectivity needs to be addressed. Thus its development is the ongoing process of the intersubjective intentionality’s fulfilling.

<§ 6. The development of humanity as development of autonomy and reason. Rational education as basis of development>

Many things are problematic here and only to be clarified through systematic and always concrete explanation of the much intertwined connections of intersubjective intentionality. The “process” is not a straight, one-way process of fulfilling. The style form “aptitude – actualization” reigns everywhere, but in continuous relativity.

If the specific humanity is essentially necessary then being transcendentally subjective in the form of autonomy belongs to the possibility of intersubjectivity. Every man as such is autonomous on its lowest steps; he chooses freely and decides, and in a way transgressing present and creating the practical surrounding world reaching beyond, and <the> correlative self-constitution of man as a unity of personality with a temporal life and self-criticism. Development of the man as man is simply performed in the autonomy and as a development of autonomy, i.e. as development of reason. The decisive step in that: development of the scientific reason as an organ of a practical reason as such, now scientifically guided. Eidetically though the problem of the development’s rising as intentionality fulfilling itself as a whole, and of the decline, repeating itself on all steps, reason and unreason as correlates, the transgressing of unreason through higher reason as a means of rising. The passivity always there, always basis of activity, of freedom. But decline into passivity, into unfreedom as weakness on the one hand, as easing of the free force’s tension, as giving in to the mere drives, on the other hand as necessary process of reason’s reduction to a technique, of the inner change of activity into secondary passivity. Clarification thus of the constant necessity of reflective sense-investigation and self-criticism and eventually of universal self-criticism of every [442] transcendental subject, as being co-responsible for all others within it, and staging the ways of universal self-responsibility within it and the responsibility of the community for its being and its world. This necessity though is a necessity of development in the development of freedom and shows the way towards the further intersubjective development as development of humanity in the freedom of all human self-responsibility, in progressive testing life by a norm through human reason progressing itself thereby. But all <former> steps are kept as well on every step, and are in a certain way in function as well. The development of humanity repeats itself in every generative single Ego, in its individual development as education towards man as man in the historical present.

The rational education, regulated from norms of freedom, then becomes the basis of development and is itself historically in development, is itself there in different states of perfection, on all steps of passive equalizing itself to man’s surrounding world and cultural surrounding world, having become historical, towards purposeful, freely considering education, up to the rational relatively perfect one. On top of that education as a communalized one, community as subjectivity, which wants to educate its youth, meeting educational events, schools, etc.

Transcendental morphology and as morphology of development – uncovered phenomenologically from the inside, in its intentional style of essence and its being from essential necessities.

This is the universal and thereby transcendental history. It is germ and actualization in all states. And since as a whole it is development itself, and includes a sense of development, that is, rise, way of fulfilling, thus for the whole we need to talk of germ and actualization. The question on its telos comes up. We have the abnormal, ill, perverse in detail, and even in the germs. Can there be something like that in the whole as well? Can all men become crazy, and <can> still a world exist, transcendent subjectivity exist, etc.?

The final questions. In order for the world to exist and the subjectivity constituting it (the world having the essentially necessary forms of the logos as such, of the true being, which the scientific [443] phenomenologist cognizes though afterwards), it, proceeding on essential steps from being in advance towards the being, has to also constitute the rational man in itself. It already needs to be reason and needs to be able to bring itself to the logical self-uncovering within the rational subject.

And then reason shows that in truth, and in the necessary form of the all-unity something being can only be from the will of reason, lifting the rational man onto the step of the autonomous one in the complete sense and bringing him as well as his world in the course of the necessarily beloved, necessarily wanted shape of development, from freedom, as which is will from necessities of reason, and thereby transgresses death and all irrationalities. They are necessarily there, as long as transcendental life is in progress, and they are necessary for it and for a world from it. But life and being remain necessary for so long as it is one to be wanted and wanted in absolute necessity of reason.

<§ 7. Development of reason and the universal teleology. Reason as precondition and telos of the becoming of a reasonable humanity>

But eventually the universal telos, uncovering the phenomenological reason and determines it according to its genuine sense, in relation to the endless idea of absolute perfection, not as a finally to be reached thing. All that can be reached is finite, all being as a temporal one is in finiteness and still is only on the way towards infinity, i.e., under the idea of absolute perfection. It is always an idea guiding the development, but the development in its endless implicit horizons always relativizes that, which is already perfect in its limitation, apart from that, which has not been realized and is already intended.

Man lifting himself onto the step of the understandingly judging and eventually phenomenological reason performs his explicit constitution within himself. As a man of reason he unfolds the reason germ inherent within him and developed on a lower step. He unfolds the being in freedom germ in the will for perfect freedom, whereby the goal for him [444] is already conscious and guiding as an intended, but not yet clarified one. Man needs to already be in freedom in order to actualize freedom. He needs to already be in freedom – on the step of the goal’s pre-certainty; and in current free action he performs consideration, on-going sense-investigation, intentional unfolding, method and eventually science as a method, which is itself a free formation of reason and a piece of content, but at the same time a serving one, serving reason, which is to be actualized as such, which, itself a being in the process, functions for the universal being in the process of on-going constitution from freedom. The developed reason, on top the philosophical reason, uncovers the universal being in a clarifying way, uncovers it in its constitution up towards the true being of the highest sense, which is being from universal reason. But the clarifying uncovering itself is deed of the already developed reason, and the uncovered thing, the preliminary steps of truth and of the true being, is reasonably uncovered and is only conceivable from the performance of the already being reason, which is thus always presupposed for something being of every step. And the reason uncovers as an essential example its own future, uncovers its own necessary way towards ever more universal reason. Acting in a freely theoretical way, it creates its future possibilities and the future necessities of the will, which must be wanted from freedom, and implicitly already are in the will, if true being shall arrive at true being in the relativity of development belonging to the relativity of truth itself. But this reason as an uncovering one and actualizing itself is indeed my reason as an Ego for me at first; but intentionally implied in that and mediately actualizing itself through empathy foreign reason as well in its shapes of development. Reason is already actualized on the step of scientific reason not only as mine, but as freely active in community. The science is intersubjective science. The scientific acting is acting within communalization, whereby every subject has the telos of scientifically rational ongoing life and of endlessly constituting theory, even if [the telos] guides in an unclear way, but on top of that each [has] the telos to actualize common theory, common truth in itself and true being “in itself” in common experiencing, thinking, etc. And thus [445] eventually phenomenology as well as a universal science from radical groundings, from common responsibilities, which at the same time shall be absolute scientific self-responsibilities of everyone, as a science of that, which is universally and in the eventually true sense, eventually grounded and directed up towards final being and truth. Science of the communalized scientists, science for those understanding afterwards and not working themselves along, science as a special profession apart from other professions, belonging to the unity of the common life of the respectively self-contained humanity and of the universal humanity eventually, and necessarily belonging to their life’s enabling. Man as a professional man and yet at the same time man as such, having and necessarily having a life beyond his profession.

Uncovering of life’s necessities, of the human being of the lower steps, an uncovering performing the rational life of the highest steps as science (or already pre-scientifically, but as a rough consideration of reason).

Essential forms of mental life of lower steps, essential forms of the mental life’s development from its relative low steps and its ongoing development towards higher ones.

The essence of transcendental subjectivity implies that the wholeness of life, of the generatively unified life, is motivated through and through and thereby in such a way that unity of temporalization, of the objective temporalization of a world, in which subjects are objectivated as well, is a unity of the development’s motivation.

The lower step does not know anything yet of that future becoming intentional from its intentionality, but its becoming is still a becoming towards reason. It of course does not have any knowledge of the true being. This is performance of the reason that has become, but simply [the fact] that I, the one performing this, am and am apodictically, and am in my human community, shows a relationship of development going straightforwardly and necessarily towards reason. Apodictic science, apodictically cleft to the being, shows in an apodictic way the relationship of motivation which has never ceased, and its direction towards the being in the form of reasonable humanity, which is a precondition at the same time, [446] because being only has a sense from it. The being is not prior to the “man” and to reason, but only within it and through it. And on the other side, as something prior to reason becoming the rational on preliminary steps, whereby reason though is presupposed as being, it is true being as something prior to reason and “afterwards constituting” development through already being reason. Reason as eventually, in a final sense, constituting being, being of all relativities of being, is in a certain way above all being and yet is itself a step of the being, as “cognized” by already being reason. But if we take reason, acting in philosophical action, then the question is, whether in temporalization, or rather, in objective temporality, reason is always already there as a temporal, real one. It develops “ontogenetically” from germs within the individual. But within the fellow human connection? How within humanity? It develops there as well – as much as it needs to lead towards me, and to us as scientists, philosophers and to our free demands then resulting from there. But does perhaps the essential constitution of the endless world as a necessary human world imply that this needs to remain in relatively self-contained finitenesses, respectively <in such ones>, in which humanity necessarily develops towards reason, that is, in such a way, that particular planets, stars with particular humanities develop, and that reason is always already currently there in the objective temporality (constituting itself in each and also containing all stars in its horizon, although unaccessibly)? This concept is not especially recommended yet. But all needs to be considered. Can reason start and stop in the constituted existence? Can the constitutive process, it finally has freely put into action, be futile? Can being (and implied therein true, absolute value enabling final being) be an empty intention in this way, which sticks to the passing actualization, by me, being a subject of reason at the moment, cognizable as that, constitutible? Can it be otherwise than that reason, acting over-temporally and all-temporally, presupposes “germ – actualization”, presupposes becoming towards real rationality, but in such a way that every actualization happening in limitation eventually gets into contact with other actualizations of such a kind, in which what has been acquired by such a development would always need to enter connection with that of other ones? Is being, true being, an over-temporal [447] idea, which is always implied in realization, in actual constitution of the being, with a continuously constituted world as a being one, with men as rational beings? And is reason thereby eternal or a correlatively perfect being, perfect truth, perfect being all? <Is reason> an idea giving a relative sense to all things in the all temporality, making possible in a totality of being everything that exists, that is, as the immanent power (in the parable) or power, all being sticks to?

The God-idea and the idea of the teleology of the worlds as a principle of a possible totality of being must become a problem, in one with the clarification of how far this teleology reaches and how far it derives from the love for being and the free will, as “divine merci” motivated from freedom itself, itself in the “governing” of chances, the irrationalities, of death and fate of any form. And I thereby mean especially that governing, which has a personal address to me, the one being hit by fate, at first abstracted from the general governing making all world a unity, and into which it still belongs. And here the problem of belief – of the belief on the lower steps and of the belief on the step of reason, giving an eye to that of the lower steps by uncovering.

The universal theory of the world’s constitution as correlate of the transcendental subjectivity constituting itself is accompanied by the universal theory of evidence and the steps of relative apodicticity, in which the transcendental subjectivity brings the proper being sense and that of all worldliness onto the step of the logos.

Each evidence has its <right>, but only its relative right. But that and in how far it is right, that is performance and statement of the transcendentally logical evidence, which is itself justified in an iteratively transcendentally logical way. Eventually the evidence of the world of totality, the evidence of the totality of the transcendental, that is, absolute being, of the absolute universe. But evidences reaching into the totality exist otherwise as well. Every evidence of the everyday practice has its horizons – the relation to its situation; implicitly this implies the whole world, but we know that association does not reach into infinity with its awakening. But it is clear that every religious evidence in the most proper sense (that of a “genuine” religion [448] in contrast to the “evidence” of the idols related to finiteness) has an explicit relation in its sense (at least through awakening) to the totality of being. In a certain way this holds also true for the “genuine” ethical evidences, insofar as they have an essential relation to fate and death, and thereby lead back to the being’s totality and towards religion.

The universal theory of the evidences – what kind of task and performance is it? Is not phenomenology the formation of an intersubjectively intertwined evidence ideally proceeding into infinity, of the totality of the being as uncovering itself into the infinite, in which all evidences uncover their horizons and all contain the sense of function, which is always already hidden in them, <their relatedness> towards the unity of being and the unity of the transcendental subjectivity in its progressing performance of evidence? The step of the logos is founded on the lower steps and, brought to the total sense, it implies all these lower steps.

The logos, the philosophical science (theory), is a formation of the sense-investigation directed towards totality of the being. Every universal special science has an infinite area as well, and its specialty consists in a mere side of the totality, but still <is> simply a special totality. The logos of the logos’ constitution implies it itself, and thus logifies the totality of the reflective sense-investigation of the transcendental subjectivity in correlation with its performance. It is the result of the reflective sense-investigation of the transcendental intersubjectivity, executed in the single subjectivity, or rather, in the phenomenological community of single subjects; it is sense-investigation on its performance constituting world and rising in the progress of the development, and a performance according to the apodictic life form, to which a totality of the being is bound, or rather, a totality of a transcendental subjectivity in starting from the de facto and its alleged world. The logifying of a transcendental subjectivity, that is, as totality of the monads, thereby is a piece of logical self-constitution of the totality and its possible world.

The reflective sense-investigation is there as well in this total universality and shows itself in the course of this sense-investigation as the same performance for the constitution of the world (and world logifying, belonging to it), as like the common sense-investigation belonging to any practice, [449] to make it come to pass in a reasonable way. Analogous function of the practice. This sounds paradox. We, making the world come to pass? And we in reason, for making it right in the world’s creation? Here we have the three steps, corresponding to that of “childishness” and, concerning the first two, also that of the animal, the steps of a preliminary world (for example ocul<omotoric>), a present world, already being spatio-temporal, and of a complete intersubjective nature with culture. All these steps are essentially necessary and above that the step of the logos.

1. Summer term 1930. [↑](#footnote-ref-0)
2. Goods and purposes are correlates. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
3. Add intersubjectivity! [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
4. Everyone multiplies goods, Everyone has multiplied other ones. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
5. Reflection, θεωρία, wonder – game – being freed from the care for life and not in its service at first. „Pure“ science. Then science as function. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
6. Similarity with the wish to sleep without any dream, this as well is a joy! – Can the universal life of community not be designed in such a way, that all would have to despair of a satisfying existence? Or else all those with insight and maturity: that they would have to wish for the end of human life as such for themselves and those under age, etc.? And if they had the power, why then not have the right of a universal murder of humanity, a murder of the whole humanity? But suicide of the humanity also comes into question in the form of the general self-castration or abstination from reproduction. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
7. Every act of love against a foreigner has the form of a donation of lasting unification in a lasting direction towards personal univocality or beautiful „unity“. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
8. The draft for the formal doctrine of the absolute obligation, of a formal axiology of course is quite incomplete. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
9. Continuation VII to XIX <page 436, 11- page 449.9 German edition> [↑](#footnote-ref-8)